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I. Introduction 
Defendants in criminal trials in the United States have the 
right to due process under the law.1 The broad protection of the 
Due Process Clause has been used to give defendants several 
rights, and to protect the innocent and ensure that the guilty are 
                                                                                                     
 *  Candidate for J.D. 2017, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
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not given a harsher punishment than our society deems 
appropriate.2 The United States has chosen the adversarial system 
to determine truth and justice.3 In the criminal context a 
prosecutor puts forth inculpatory evidence in an effort to convince 
a judge or jury that a defendant is guilty of the accused crime.4 
Courts grant the defendant the right to cross examine and disprove 
any evidence that the prosecution has put forward.5 In this context 
the government wields enormous power and resources, and the 
defendant is afforded certain rights, including the presumption of 
innocence.6 
 Due to modern advances in science, the use of evidence in 
criminal trials has evolved.7 Particularly in rape and murder 
trials, the prosecution often presents scientific evidence.8 The 
government has the resources at its disposal to hire scientists to 
present and explain the evidence to the court, but defendants often 
lack the means to hire their own scientists to challenge the 
prosecution’s evidence.9 The adversarial nature of trial and the 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (finding that the 
Constitution requires state courts to appoint an attorney for criminal defendants 
who cannot afford one on their own).  
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting defendants the right to confront 
witnesses against him, compelling witness in his favor, and have counsel to assist 
in defense); David A. Harris, Criminal Law, the Constitution, and Truth Seeking: 
A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 469, 512 (1992) (“[T]he constitutional rights designed to make real 
the assumptions of the adversary system—that the prosecution and defense 
present the strongest, relevant available evidence to the factfinder, which can 
then arrive at the most accurate decision possible.”). 
 4. See Harris, supra note 3, at 496–97 (explaining the fundamentals of 
criminal trials and how they are influenced by money). 
 5. See id. at 505–06 (detailing the right of criminal defendants to engage in 
cross-examination).  
 6. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (establishing the 
presumption of innocence of persons accused of crimes).  
 7. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 4 (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ 
dnaevid.pdf (“Perhaps the most significant advance in criminal investigation 
since the advent of fingerprint identification is the use of DNA technology to help 
convict criminals or eliminate persons as suspects.”).  
 8. See id. at 12 (explaining that forensic evidence used in convictions is 
usually used in rapes, sometimes resulting in murder, due to the nature of the 
crime).  
 9. See Harris, supra note 3, at 469 (“Despite the constitutional requirement 
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highly technical nature of this evidence creates a presumption of 
guilt if the defendant is unable to impeach the prosecution’s 
evidence with his or her own expert.10 Yet, indigent defendants 
that meet certain criteria are permitted experts. The Ake v. 
Oklahoma “basic tools” principle, helps defendants to provide a 
defense by supplying them with expert aid.11 That being said, 
thousands of defendants are convicted based on scientific evidence 
every year without being afforded an expert to help prepare his or 
her defense.12 Additionally, a recent trend in exonerations has seen 
that a significant portion of these conditions are based on improper 
evidence.13  
While defendants unable to afford expert witnesses, including 
forensic experts, are facially allowed to request one provided by the 
state, the high level of showing required by the defendant 
effectively destroys this right.14 By effectively denying defendants 
the means to refute technical evidence presented against them, the 
current criminal trial process effectively creates a presumption of 
guilt.15 This trend is especially apparent in Virginia, where 
defendants have been systematically denied forensic experts in 
rape and murder cases where there is any witness or testimonial 
                                                                                                     
that the state supply indigent defendants with counsel, other resources critical to 
a defense—the services of investigators, scientists and other experts—remain 
luxuries for indigent defendants.”).  
 10. See Alice B. Lustere, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for 
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 
5th 453 (2004) (explaining how separate states have developed systems for judges 
to act as gatekeepers in determining whether DNA evidence is more prejudicial 
than probative).  
 11. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (“[F]undamental fairness 
entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their claims 
fairly within the adversary system’ . . . . we have focused on identifying the ‘basic 
tools of an adequate defense or appeal,’ and . . . have required that such tools be 
provided to . . . defendants who cannot afford to pay for them”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 12. See JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE AND 
IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1 (2006), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf (analyzing the impact of 
forensic evidence on criminal convictions).   
 13. Id.  
 14. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance 
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1363 (2004) (“If 
the [Ake] standard is too demanding, the right is gutted.”).  
 15. Id.  
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evidence brought against them in addition to the forensic 
evidence.16 The standard in Virginia stems from the ambiguity of 
Ake and the Supreme Court’s subsequent case law heightening the 
standard within the state.17 
II. Background 
A. Forensic Evidence and Convictions 
Forensic evidence is evidence that is considered scientific in 
nature and is provided to the court during trial to create a record.18 
Forensic evidence is different from eye witness testimony evidence 
or confessions from defendants in that it is often provided to the 
court by an expert witness, usually a scientist.19 Forensic evidence 
used in convictions has increased in the past twenty years, and this 
is due to the advances in science, especially in DNA analyses.20 In 
the late 1980s, courts in the United States began using 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as forensic evidence to convict 
suspects in criminal trials.21 The use of broad forensic evidence, 
particularly DNA evidence, heralded a new era of convictions 
where forensic evidence was more commonly used to convict, even 
going so far as to be the only evidence against a defendant.22 
                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 928–29 (Va. 1996) 
(denying the indigent defendant accused of rape a DNA expert at the 
Commonwealth’s expense because the defendant failed to show a particularized 
need since he confessed to the crime).   
 17. See id. at 924 (“The indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an 
expert must show a particularized need.”).  
 18. See COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF 
EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 1–3 (2004) (explaining that forensic evidence 
is evidence that is “transfer” or “trace” evidence that is brought by the criminal to 
the crime and can be traced back to the criminal using various scientific methods).  
 19. Id.  
 20. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (highlighting how the increased 
use of DNA has helped convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent).  
 21. Id; see also id. at 1 (explaining how the use of DNA has led to a higher 
rate of accuracy in identifying criminal defendants).   
 22. See Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone is 
Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1131–33 (2010) (discussing how 
statistics and probability have allowed juries to convict defendants solely using 
DNA evidence that is less than a perfect match of the defendant’s DNA, but is so 
close that it is a significant individualized showing). 
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Defendants could be convicted based on DNA analyses of saliva, 
blood, hair, skin tissue, and semen.23 These advances in scientific 
techniques allowed states and the federal government to connect 
criminals to their crimes, usually in the context of rapes and 
murders, in ways not before possible.24 Forensic evidence also 
became useful by allowing government investigators to exclude 
suspects whose DNA did not match.25 In total, forty-six states and 
the federal government currently allow DNA as admissible 
evidence.26 
Forensic evidence—including hair microscopy, bite mark 
comparisons, firearm tool mark analysis, and shoe print 
comparisons—is highly technical and cannot be admitted without 
an expert witness.27  
Forensic evidence, and all scientific evidence for that matter, 
presented in Court must meet the Daubert Standard, which was 
created by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.28 
In Daubert the Supreme Court determined that contrary to prior 
case precedent, a “general acceptance” of scientific standards is not 
a necessary precondition to admitting scientific evidence under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.29 The Supreme Court created a flexible 
standard for judges to assess the admissibility of scientific 
evidence by looking at the “potential rate of error” and “existence 
and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques 
                                                                                                     
 23. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 4 (listing evidence that could be 
traced back to criminals either through DNA or other scientific methods). 
 24. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 (acknowledging that in most 
crimes there is no forensic evidence, but due to the nature of rape and murder, 
there are often traces of the criminal at the crime scene).  
 25. Id.  
 26. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 7 (showing which states allow DNA 
as admissible evidence).  
 27. See id. at 6 (“The state of the profiling technology and the methods for 
estimating frequencies and related statistics have progressed to the point where 
the admissibility of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in 
doubt.”).  
 28. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Unlike 
an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer 
opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or 
observation.”). 
 29. See id. at 587 (determining that “general acceptance” standard was 
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence).  
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operation[.]”.30 Upon admission of scientific evidence, the opposing 
side’s cross examination and precise instruction on the burden of 
proof are the two means to attack shaky evidence.31 
Courts have acknowledged that forensic evidence is 
questionably accurate as the results of forensic testing and 
analyses are often based on probability.32 It is the state and the 
federal governments that will most often present forensic and DNA 
evidence at trial.33 Courts have allowed defendants to challenge 
expert witnesses and the tests used during cross examination, but 
this adversarial technique to divulge truth and accuracy is not 
always useful to the defendant if the defendant does not have the 
means to hire their own forensic expert to challenge the 
government’s expert testimony and DNA evidence.34  
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 592 (allowing the judge to make a finding about the 
admissibility of scientific evidence that can be challenged on cross examination).  
 31. Id. at 596.  
 32. See generally Andrea Roth, Denying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the 
Jury in the Age of Scientific Proof and Innocence, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1643 (2013); see 
also Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/unvalidated-or-improper-forensic-
science/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“Unlike DNA testing, many forensic 
disciplines . . . were developed solely to solve crime. These disciplines have 
evolved primarily through their use in individual cases. Without the benefit of 
sufficient foundational research or adequate financial resources, applied research 
has also been minimal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 33. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufield, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (exploring forensic 
science testimony by prosecution experts in the trials of innocent persons all 
convicted of serious crimes).  
 34. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 
Dist. 1988) (“In contrast to evidence derived from hypnosis, truth serum and 
polygraph, evidence derived from DNA print identification appears based on 
proven scientific principles. Indeed, there was testimony that such evidence has 
been used to exonerate those suspected of criminal activity.”); see also State v. 
Woodall, 182 W. Va. 15, 23 (W. Va. 1989) (allowing that “[b]lood type and enzyme 
tests have general scientific acceptance, and the distribution of particular blood 
traits in the population is ascertainable,” and that the defendant has the 
opportunity to impeach such forensic tests through cross examination of the 
expert witness); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 783 (Va. 1989) 
(“[U]ndisputed evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that DNA testing is 
a reliable scientific technique and that the tests performed in the present case 
were properly conducted, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting this 
evidence.”).   
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The flaws in the adversarial system when it comes to forensic 
evidence can be seen in the wave of exonerations that began in 
1989.35 According to the Innocence Project, there have been more 
than 333 post-conviction exonerations in the United States since 
1989.36 In a bulk of these convictions the jury or judge relied on 
forensic evidence that misstated or was unsupported by empirical 
data.37 
In each case where forensic evidence and testimony were 
presented against the defendant, the defendant was protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which afford the defendant 
the due process of law.38 Due process governs a defendant’s right 
to cross examine the witnesses, but this is not any use without the 
help of an expert witness due to the technical nature of the 
evidence.39 Since the evidence is scientific in nature and indigent 
defendants often lack the means to hire an expert witness, the 
practical effect of forensic evidence is that the prosecution has 
highly prejudicial evidence and the defendant lacks the means to 
counter either the probative or prejudicial value of the evidence.40 
Though defendants have had the right to ask the state to provide 
an independent expert witness for them since 1985, it has not 
changed the convictions based on improper forensic evidence.41 
There are several systemic and policy breakdowns in the chain 
of determining guilt. A major failure of the system is inherent to 
the adversarial nature of criminal procedure when forensic 
evidence is presented against indigent defendants who are unable 
                                                                                                     
 35. Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, supra note 32.  
 36. Id.  
 37. See Garrett & Neufield, supra note 33 (indicating that scientific 
identifiers of defendants were being misused). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 39. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1985) (explaining that due 
process provides for “meaningful access to justice.”); see also NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 204 (1996) [hereinafter 
NRC II] (explaining that because the National Research Council recognized the 
potential of misuse of DNA evidence from the jurors’ perspective, it recommended 
a study to reduce the prejudicial nature of DNA evidence). 
 40. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 70 (finding that an indigent defendant was entitled 
to a psychiatrist as an expert as a matter of due process during the defendant’s 
capital sentencing); see also NRC II, supra note 39 (explaining the scientific 
nature of DNA evidence).  
 41. See generally Roth, supra note 22. 
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to afford the means to fight such evidence.42 The guarantee of 
expert witnesses to indigent defendants, and the failure to deliver 
on that guarantee, is a denial of these defendants’ Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
B. Indigent’s Right to Expert Witnesses 
Indigent defendants occupy a vulnerable position in both state 
and federal criminal justice systems. Though the Constitution 
grants defendants broad rights, many of these rights are useless 
unless the defendant has the means or the knowledge to actually 
implement them.43 As was determined by the Supreme Court in 
Gideon v. Wainwright,44 an indigent defendant, like a lay-
defendant, lacks the knowledge of how to procedurally assert his 
or her rights at trial, without the effective assistance of counsel.45 
The Supreme Court therefore held that federal and state 
governments are both required to provide an attorney to those who 
lack the means to hire their own.46 The right to an attorney for an 
indigent defendant is required under the Sixth and Fifth 
Amendments because an attorney is necessary in unlocking many 
other rights at trial, and defending against the state who is 
provided with attorneys of its own.47 
Along the same lines as the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 
the Supreme Court decided in Ake v. Oklahoma that an indigent 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (“[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the 
State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has 
access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”). 
 43. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
of law. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one.”).   
 44. See id. (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal trial has a right 
to be represented by counsel under the Sixth Amendment). 
 45. Id. at 345.  
 46. See id. at 344 (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).  
 47. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985) (acknowledging that the 
federal and state constitutions create procedural and substantive safeguards so 
that all defendants are created equal before the law, and the indigent require 
state provided attorneys in order to ensure this equality).  
VIRGINIA’S INTERPRETATION OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA 499 
defendant is entitled to an expert witness if he or she can make a 
proper showing to the government.48 In Ake, the defendant was 
denied a psychiatric expert witness provided by the government.49 
The defendant had been charged with the murder of a couple and 
of injuring their two children.50 The defendant informed the court 
that he would be presenting the defense of insanity, and requested 
that the state provide an expert witness: a court appointed 
psychiatrist.51 The court denied Ake’s request, and Ake’s sole 
defense during the trial was insanity, but no expert witness was 
brought forward to provide the psychiatric evidence needed.52 Ake 
was convicted, which he appealed.53  
The Supreme Court determined that Ake’s insanity defense 
was a significant factor in both the guilt and sentencing phases of 
the trial, and that according to due process a defendant should be 
afforded “basic tools” necessary to present a defense.54 The 
Supreme Court held that when a defendant in a criminal 
prosecution makes a preliminary showing that his or her defense, 
such as insanity at the time of the offense, is likely to be a 
significant factor at trial the Constitution requires that the state 
provide the defendant access to a psychiatrist if the defendant 
cannot otherwise afford one.55  
In Ake the Supreme Court provided defendants with a narrow 
right, but one that is invaluable, especially as science has pushed 
evidence to new levels.56 While Ake did not allow for defendants to 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. at 69 (listing factors considered for witness entitlement, such as 
private interest affected by the action of the state, government interest if the 
safeguard is provided, and the probable value of these safeguards and the risk or 
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if safeguards are not provided).  
 49. Id. at 68. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.   
 52. See id. (explaining that the trial court denied a psychiatric witness that 
the petitioner requested to support his insanity defense). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 77. 
 55. See id. at 85 (acknowledging a trend to recognized elemental 
constitutional rights such as the right of an indigent defendant to attain a fair 
hearing and access to the judicial process).  
 56. See id. at 86 (granting indigent defendants the right to make a showing 
that they need an expert witness to prepare a defense that will be “a significant 
factor” in his or her trial).  
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request any expert witness be provided by the state, it did set an 
important guide that federal appellate and state courts have 
expanded.57 Additionally, it should be noted that in Caldwell v. 
Mississippi58 the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court’s 
decision not to appoint two non-psychiatric witnesses, which 
subsequent courts have called the “significant factor” standard and 
has been read together with the Ake standard to create a new 
standard.59 Several subsequent cases, including some Supreme 
Court dicta, have shown that an indigent defendant’s right to due 
process includes a right to an expert witness if he or she is able to 
show that they wish to provide a defense and need an expert to 
construct it, which is both costly but shows the prosecution the 
defendant’s case.60 
Currently the rights in Ake have mostly been codified, both at 
the federal and the state level.61 Because the Supreme Court has 
left the scope of Ake undefined, there are significant disparities in 
what rights indigents have under Ake depending on which court 
hears the case.62 Some courts have attempted to limit an indigent’s 
rights under Ake only regarding the right to a psychiatrist, while 
other courts have attempted to limit the case only to capital 
cases.63 The major trend has been to incorporate the principle in 
Ake into criminal statutes; many courts have adopted a procedural 
showing that a defendant must perform in order to be granted an 
expert provided by the government.64 Because the showing 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1316 (showing how Daubert and its 
progeny expanded the use of expert witnesses, which created the need for the 
states and federal government to provide non-psychiatric expert witnesses to 
indigents).  
 58. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
 59. See id. at 323 (determining that the petitioner’s circumstance do not 
warrant the appointment of a non-psychiatric expert witness by the court, but 
does not state that the court could not do so for an indigent in different 
circumstances); see also Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 
1996) (articulating the “significant factor” standard as applied to an indigent 
defendant who seeks an expert in his or her defense).   
 60. Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364.   
 61. Id.   
 62. See id. at 1365 (listing the various constructions of the tests within the 
federal circuits).  
 63. Id. at 1364.  
 64. See id. at 1338 (explaining how usually an indigent’s right to an expert 
witness is codified in state criminal statutes, but also acknowledging that these 
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depends on the type of defense the defendant intends to present, 
the type of expert is determined by the type of evidence that needs 
to be analyzed.65 
C. State’s Access to Expert Witnesses 
 Paul C. Giannelli, in Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to 
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, puts forth 
several compelling policy arguments as to why the Supreme Court 
and states have developed an indigent’s rights to expert witnesses 
under Ake.66 Giannelli argues that states and the federal 
government have access to expert witnesses, which are sometimes 
even institutionalized, such as state funded forensic labs.67 These 
expert witnesses are often in the government’s employment.68 
Giannelli explains that when the government brings forward 
technical evidence, the courts and defendants lack the expertise to 
be able to properly challenge evidence.69 Additionally, in some 
cases government expert witnesses are thought to be biased, so 
that the government has come to expect certain results from 
forensic or DNA tests provided to a particular expert.70  
                                                                                                     
provisions widely differ as to what type of services are available, and what the 
cost cap or reimbursement for services should entail).  
 65. See id. at 1367–68 (describing the types of expertise Ake has been extend 
to, including toxicologists, pathologists, fingerprint experts, hypnotists, DNA 
analysts, serologists, ballistics experts, handwriting examiners, blood spatter 
specialists, forensic dentists for bite-mark comparisons, and psychologists on the 
battered wife syndrome). 
 66. See generally id.  
 67. See id. at 1327 (explaining that there are over three hundred crime 
laboratories in the country, and state prosecutors have access to labs at the state, 
county, regional, and metropolitan levels, while federal prosecutors have access 
to several top labs including the FBI and the DEA labs).  
 68. See id. at 1328 (showing that state and federal prosecutors can hire 
independent labs as well as use the labs in the state employment, which include 
such experts as local coroners); see generally Garrett & Neufield, supra note 33. 
 69. See id. (indicating that the Courts and defendants lack the technical and 
scientific sophistication to challenge the Prosecution’s evidence).   
 70. See id. at 1390 (showing how the West Virginia Police Crime Laboratory 
was caught using techniques to achieve improper results, and that even after the 
improper actor moved to another state West Virginia prosecutors would send 
evidence to him).  
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There is ample evidence of forensic scientists working with 
state prosecutors to achieve the prosecution’s ends, which is 
usually the conviction of an indigent lay person unable to mount a 
cogent defense.71 Some of the more obvious cases of experts 
presenting unchallenged testimony with a certainty that they did 
not possess include state police laboratory scientist Joyce 
Gilchrist.72 Gilchrist testified and performed DNA examinations in 
roughly three thousand cases in Oklahoma City.73 Former 
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating opened an investigation when 
post-conviction FBI evidence directly contradicted Gilchrist’s 
evidence.74 The state investigators found that Gilchrist had 
misidentified evidence or given improper courtroom testimony in 
several cases where the defendant had been convicted, which was 
disconcerting considering that eight of those cases were capital 
cases.75 
Similarly, forensic scientist Arnold Melnikoff worked for state 
forensic labs in both Washington and Montana.76 The FBI later 
discovered that his testimony was entirely fabricated in a rape 
trial, and the federal government urged Montana to reexamine 
every case in which Melnikoff had presented testimony.77 The 
governor of Montana refused because Melnikoff had not said that 
the DNA evidence did not show it was the defendant “exclusively”; 
Melnikoff had said it was only a sixty percent chance, and 
therefore there was little evidence of misconduct.78 Washington 
was forced to investigate over one hundred cases where Melnikoff 
had presented evidence.79 
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 1318.  
 72. Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 2009), https://nyti.ms/2jEh5RG (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Adam Liptak, Two States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on 
ID, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2002), https://nyti.ms/2jEeAyA (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice).  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
VIRGINIA’S INTERPRETATION OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA 503 
In the Houston Police Department’s Crime Laboratory it was 
not a rogue forensic scientist who wanted to help prosecutors; the 
problems were more systemic.80 There was evidence of poor record 
keeping, improper procedures, and a lack of maintenance of 
equipment.81 The audit found this disconcerting as the lab had 
presented testimony in several rape and murder trials that they 
assured the court were precise matches to the defendants on 
trial.82 The doubt raised by the audit led the Texas Attorney 
General’s office to investigate all the cases from the previous year 
where the lab had provided evidence.83 Later, the DNA and 
toxicology labs were shut down and a lead detective was shot in his 
cubicle, it was implied that the wound was self-inflicted.84 An audit 
of every case where the lab had provided evidence was conducted.85  
The concerns over impartiality, ineffective labs and 
procedures, and the lack of expertise outside of the government’s 
prosecution have led to courts expanding Ake to beyond just the 
right to expert witnesses for psychiatric purposes, especially in the 
context of forensic and DNA evidence.86   
D. DNA Alone to Convict 
In a few cases, state and federal courts have found that DNA 
alone is sufficient to convict without corroborating evidence, but 
this is currently the exception rather than the rule.87 DNA 
                                                                                                     
 80. Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2k5T1nH (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice).  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. See Ralph Blumenthal, Double Blow, One Fatal, Strikes Police In 
Houston, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2k5HsN9 (last visited Apr. 
19, 2017) (elucidating the issues facing the Houston police and their forensic labs) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964) (“Representation under each plan shall 
include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary for 
adequate representation.”).  
 87. See generally People v. Rush, 242 A.D.2d 108, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 1998). 
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evidence and the standards of proof are a contentious subject, 
especially because DNA evidence appears infallible, and even 
when the court or jury is warned otherwise the evidence itself is 
often enough to impute some level of guilt.88 One of the more 
extreme examples where DNA alone was enough to convict was 
People v. Rush, where an FBI agent testified that the probability 
of selecting another individual at random from the population with 
the same DNA profile was 1 in 500 million.89 The court held that 
this was sufficient to make a finding of guilt.90 
Scholars find the lack of corroborating evidence in these “cold 
hit” cases, where DNA evidence is the only evidence presented, to 
be disturbing.91 The lack of protocols, standardized practices, 
quality control, and the possibility of improper interpretation or 
conscious guiding of inferences is dangerous.92 Forensic experts 
present DNA evidence using probabilities of a match to the 
defendant.93 Some scholars are concerned that the use of 
probabilities inspire confidence in the jury that does not meet the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94 Scholars acknowledge that 
such safeguards include corroborating evidence, but also include 
the defendant’s right to their own expert witnesses.95 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1358 (explaining that the use of DNA 
matching evidence makes it difficult for jurors to separate probability of 
innocence or guilt from certainty).  
 89. Id.  
 90. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 
(“Giving due deference to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the verdict [based 
only on a DNA match] is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence 
as to be clearly wrong and unjust[.]”); Katharine C. Lester, Note, The Affects of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Use of DNA Evidence at Sentencing—Can DNA 
Alone Convict of Unadjudicated Prior Acts?, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 267, 288 (2010) (“Nonetheless, the trial court placed ‘unfettered faith in the 
reliability of DNA evidence.”); see also State v. Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 131 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that DNA evidence, without corroborating 
evidence, was sufficient to support conviction). 
 91. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1138–39 (showing that relying on cold hits 
alone is risky without corroborating evidence due to the risk of probable matches). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
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III. Ake Leads to Disparity 
A. Federal Interpretation 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides expert assistance 
for indigents in federal trials, thus codifying Ake at the federal 
level.96 The problem with this codification is that federal circuits 
vary when it comes to the standard for appointing an expert 
witness in an indigent’s trial.97 The Fifth Circuit determined that 
“where the government’s case rests heavily on a theory most 
competently addressed by expert testimony, an indigent defendant 
must be afforded the opportunity to prepare and present his 
defense to such a theory with the assistance of his own expert 
pursuant to section 3006A(e)[.]”98 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit requires expert services when “a reasonable attorney 
would engage such services for a client having the independent 
financial means to pay for them[.]”99 This “‘private attorney’ 
standard for determining necessity is based on the equal protection 
rationale.”100 In addition, the “relative strictness of the standard is 
sometimes difficult to discern” not only because the language of 
Ake is already ambiguous, but also because it is often read together 
with other subsequent case law that might or might not be dicta.101 
The First Circuit requires that the proffered expert testimony be 
“pivotal” or “critical” to the defense.102 In contrast to this stringent 
test, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the trial court may reject 
an application for appointment if the accused “does not have a 
plausible claim or defense[.]”103 The Eleventh Circuit’s 
interpretation is a much less demanding test for the indigent to 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1332 (indicating that indigent 
defendants in Federal Court will be provided with their own expert witnesses if 
they meet the necessary standard). 
 97. Id. at 1336.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
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meet.104 The differences across the federal districts illustrate the 
lack of guidance from the Ake standard.  
B. Virginia’s Interpretation 
This confusion stemming from the Ake standard has been seen 
in state courts as well.105 This has been especially true in Virginia. 
Virginia has not adopted a codified recognition of Ake in its 
criminal statutes, but instead relies solely on case law.106 Husske 
v. Commonwealth is Virginia’s seminal case on an indigent’s rights 
to an expert witness.107 Criticized by many, the case grants 
indigent defendants in the Commonwealth the opportunity to 
make an Ake showing about the necessity of an expert witness to 
develop a defense that will be a significant factor in their trial.108 
However, an indigent defendant’s right to an expert witness is not 
an explicit Constitutional right.109 The Supreme Court in Virginia 
interprets Ake interestingly; it reads reading Ake with Caldwell to 
create a level of showing not explained in either case.110 As 
mentioned before, Caldwell was a Supreme Court case with a 
footnote that seemed to establish a “significant factor” showing for 
granting the appointment of an indigent defendant.111 Caldwell 
                                                                                                     
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. at 1338–39 (showing how state criminal statutes or rulings 
providing an expert witness to a defendant vary widely).   
 106. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-332 (allowing compensation for counsel or 
expert witnesses for indigent witnesses not mandated).  
 107. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 924 (Va. 1996) (“The 
Commonwealth asserts that the defendant has no constitutional right under the 
Due Process or Equal Protection clauses for the appointment, at the 
Commonwealth’s expense, of a DNA expert.”). 
 108. Id.  
 109. See id. at 925 (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
merely requires, “an adequate opportunity [for defendant] to present [his] claims 
fairly within the adversary system.”). 
 110. See id. (“We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together, 
require that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent 
defendants with ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense,’ and, that in certain 
instances, these basic tools may include the appointment of non-psychiatric 
experts”) (internal citations omitted).  
 111. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“But petitioner 
also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and 
a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State Supreme Court 
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was a capital murder case that dealt primarily with appellate 
review, but the Supreme Court mentioned in a footnote that the 
trial court did not err in not appointing a state funded ballistics 
expert. 112 The trial court had provided the defendant a psychiatric 
expert.113 The Supreme Court stated “[g]iven that petitioner 
offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested 
assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due 
process in the trial judge’s decision [to deny.]”114 The Supreme 
Court of Virginia determined that indigent defendants must make 
a showing of a “particularized need,” much like the “significant 
factor” showing in Ake.115 Unlike the Supreme Court in Ake, 
Virginia’s particularized need showing incorporates a 
reasonableness element from Caldwell.116 The reasonableness and 
significant factor requirements allow a court to determine the case 
as a whole, and the relevance of the evidence that the defendant 
has requested an expert to develop.117 
Virginia’s interpretation of Ake and Caldwell, especially 
including the reasonableness element, has created such a high 
standard that indigent defendants have rarely been able to meet 
it.118 As subsequent Virginia case law has shown, indigent 
defendants are usually denied the right to an expert witness, 
especially a forensic expert in rape and murder cases, unless DNA 
evidence is the only type of evidence presented against them.119 
                                                                                                     
affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to 
their reasonableness.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 1996) 
(explaining that a particularized need analysis includes looking and the 
probability of impact on the outcome of the trial, as well as the cost of the expert 
witness).  
 116. Id.   
 117. See id. at 211 (“[A]n indigent defendant may satisfy this burden by 
demonstrating that the services of an expert would materially assist him in the 
preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial”) (citing State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114, 117 (N.C. 
1992)).  
 118. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1366 (analyzing the disparity between 
prosecution and defense resources, especially for indigent defendants).  
 119. See generally Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL 
1222400 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006).  
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This is a departure from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of due 
process, yet its vague ruling in Ake has essentially destroyed the 
right that it intended to create.120 Virginia has created a more 
stringent standard than the “basic tools” standard from Ake by 
adding an element of reasonableness from the footnotes of 
Caldwell.121 Additionally, Virginia’s particularized need exception 
to an indigent defendant’s right to an expert witness is inherently 
flawed, in that a defendant will not be able to show the 
particularized need for the expert witness because the very reason 
they need the witness is to produce the evidence that would be the 
substance of the particularized need.   
IV. Virginia’s Standard Applied 
A. Standard Not Met 
Virginia has not strayed away from the particularized need 
that the Virginia Supreme Court established in Husske v. 
Commonwealth.122 In many cases Virginia has provided expert 
witnesses to indigent defendants charged with murder or rape and 
the state only provided DNA or forensic evidence to convict.123 
Virginia courts have established the particularized need rule from 
Husske, but in many cases Virginia seems to only grant indigent 
defendants expert witnesses in murder and rape cases where the 
particularized need is that the prosecutors’ only evidence against 
the defendant is DNA forensic in nature.124 Virginia courts seem 
                                                                                                     
 120. See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 73 (1985).  
 121. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“But petitioner 
also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and 
a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State Supreme Court 
affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to 
their reasonableness.”). 
 122. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 1996) 
(crafting the particularized need standard); Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-
05-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *3 (utilizing the particularized need standard); 
Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383, 393 (Va. 2006) (deciding that the 
defendant had not met the particularized need standard).   
 123.  See generally Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013); 
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009).  
 124. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (detailing that “[t]he indigent defendant 
who seeks the appointment of an expert must show a particularized need”); see 
VIRGINIA’S INTERPRETATION OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA 509 
to determine that a defendant has a particularized need when the 
prosecutor is relying solely on DNA or forensic evidence, against 
which a defendant would not be able to present a successful 
defense without any help from a DNA expert.125 In such cases the 
Commonwealth has given the defendant the means to hire an 
expert witness to rebut the Commonwealth’s claims, but often even 
the stipend the defendant is given to hire an independent expert 
witness is not enough to properly rebut the Commonwealth’s 
claims.126 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has created a standard that 
combined elements from Ake and Caldwell to create a standard 
that is more stringent than either standard used by itself.127 The 
practical effect is that indigent defendants must meet a standard 
that the Virginia Supreme Court created using two already 
ambiguous standards from separate cases with materially 
distinguishable facts.128  
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a defendant 
who wants to have the Commonwealth provide an expert witness 
must show a particularized need so that the Commonwealth does 
not waste time and resources on every defendant asking for an 
expert.129 In order to demonstrate a particularized need, the 
defendant must show that there is relevant evidence requiring an 
impartial expert qualified to bring the evidence to trial.130 An 
unacknowledged trend in Virginia is that Courts will refuse expert 
witnesses—particularly DNA and forensic analysts—if there is 
evidence other than DNA and forensics that indicate a defendant’s 
                                                                                                     
also Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 396 (Va. 2011) (“The only physical 
evidence linking Angel to the crime . . . was the DNA evidence.”).  
 125. See generally Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d; Dowdy, 686 S.E.2d. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925–26 (showing that Virginia has departed 
from the basic tools principles of Ake and has created a heightened standard of 
“particularized need” (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 
(1985))).  
 128. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364 (discussing the difficulties indigent 
defendants face when trying to secure expert witnesses).   
 129. Id. 
 130. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 1996) (“As we 
previously stated, an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert, 
at the Commonwealth’s expense, must show a particularized need for such 
services and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.”).  
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guilt.131 In effect, Virginia’s heightened standard creates a more 
difficult showing than that which the Supreme Court required in 
Ake, which means that the particularized need showing violates a 
defendant’s “basic tools of an adequate defense[.]”132  
Husske first established this heightened standard. Husske, 
the defendant, was arrested on “peeping tom” charges and taken 
to a Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation Services 
office.133 The woman he was observing had been raped a few 
months earlier, but the assailant had fled.134 While at the facility 
with his wife, the facility staff asked Husske if he had been 
involved in rape in addition to the voyeurism.135 Husske denied 
being involved in a rape, but after his wife left the room and he 
was questioned further Husske stated that even though this was 
his first arrest on such a charge, he had been engaging in this 
behavior for 20 years and had gone “one step further.”136 Husske 
was convicted of the “peeping tom” charges.137 After an attempted 
suicide and while he was serving time Husske confessed to Dr. 
Elwood that he had completed a rape at the facility where he was 
caught peeping a few months earlier.138 Husske described some 
elements of the victim’s initial rape, but some elements that 
differed.139  
The court declared Husske indigent when brought to trial, and 
his counsel moved prior to and at trial that the Commonwealth 
provide the defendant an expert witness for the DNA and forensic 
evidence that would be presented by the prosecution.140 Instead 
                                                                                                     
 131. See id. at 922–24 (describing the defendant’s crimes and subsequent 
confession); Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *1, 
*8 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006) (affirming the denial of an expert witness for a 
defendant in a case where the defendant had stated the victim’s race before police 
mentioned it). 
 132. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d 920, 929 (Poff, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
defendant had met the showing under Ake, but the majority requires a two-part 
showing).  
 133. Id. at 922. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 923. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.   
 140. Id.   
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the Commonwealth appointed a respected attorney co-counsel 
because he was “the most knowledgeable member of the local bar 
in the area of forensic DNA application[.]”141 The Commonwealth 
brought an employee of the Commonwealth’s Division of Forensic 
Science, and a professor of statistics and genetics at North 
Carolina State University to present the forensic DNA evidence 
against Husske.142 
Husske was ultimately convicted of the rape, and on appeal 
the Supreme Court of Virginia took the words “particularized 
necessity” from the footnotes of the United States Supreme Court 
case Caldwell in order to create the particularized need standard 
in Virginia.143 The Caldwell standard required that an indigent 
defendant must show reasonableness when requesting a Court 
appointed expert witness.144 First, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
determined that the defendant, Husske, made no showing of a 
particularized need.145 Husske had only asked for an expert 
witness to address the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence.146 He had 
not shown how the evidence would factor into his defense at 
trial.147 Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia also determined 
that even if Husske had shown that the expert testimony would 
factor into his defense that it would not be a significant factor.148 
Husske had confessed to the rape, which meant that he would be 
unable to show that he had been prejudiced because a 
                                                                                                     
 141. See id. at 924–25 (showing how the motion for an expert witness was 
dismissed, but the lower court acknowledged the DNA evidence as relevant and 
attempted to resolve the inequitable state of expertise by appointing an attorney 
well-read on DNA as co-counsel). 
 142. Id. at 923–24. 
 143. See id. at 926 (“[T]he determination . . . whether a defendant has made 
an adequate showing of particularized necessity lies within the discretion of the 
trial judge.”).  
 144. Id. at 925.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. See id. at 924–26 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court of Virginia 
acknowledges both the “basic tools” and “significant factor” standards from Ake, 
but uses the more obscure and less applicable “particularized necessity” language 
from Caldwell).  
 148. See id. (illustrating that Husske would have failed the Ake standard of 
showing that the evidence for which he needed the expert would be a significant 
factor in his defense).  
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particularized need to his defense would have to address both the 
confession and the DNA evidence.149  
The Supreme Court of Virginia took the reasonableness 
standard when appointing experts from Caldwell and combined it 
with the Ake standard.150 The Supreme Court of Virginia created 
a new standard outside of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Ake by reading the 
two standards of showing together.151 The heightened standard 
makes it difficult for indigent defendants in Virginia to 
successfully motion for appointment of an expert witness.152   
Virginia Courts have tended to deny an indigent’s motion of 
an expert witness where other evidence is presented outside of just 
the DNA evidence.153 In Angel v. Commonwealth154 an assailant in 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 926 (“[H]e confessed to the crimes, and he described the details 
of his offenses with great specificity.”).  
 150. See id. at 925. The Supreme Court of Virginia explained their reading of 
Ake and Caldwell as follows: 
We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together, require 
that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent 
defendants with the basic tools of an adequate defense, and, that in 
certain instances; these basic tools may include the appointment of 
non-psychiatric experts. This Due Process requirement, however, does 
not confer a right upon an indigent defendant to receive, at the 
Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a non-indigent defendant 
may purchase. Rather, the Due Process clause merely requires that the 
defendant may not be denied “an adequate opportunity to present [his] 
claims fairly within the adversary system.” 
Id.  
 151. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).  
 152. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 929 (Va. 1996) (Poff, R., 
dissenting) (criticizing the court’s adoption of a two-fold showing, especially when 
the defendant had moved five separate times for an appointment of an expert 
witness).  
 153. See infra text accompanying notes 156–211. 
 154. See Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (affirming 
the lower court). The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:  
there was no reversible error in denying Angel’s motion to suppress his 
custodial interrogation, in denying Angel’s appeal of the order of the 
JDR court certifying the charges against him to the grand jury . . . in 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictments, in denying his motion 
for appointment and compensation for a DNA expert and denying his 
motion for a continuance, in joining the trials of separate offenses and 
admitting evidence of other crimes, and in denying Angel’s motion for 
mistrial[, and] the imposition of life sentences without parole in this 
case is not cruel and unusual.  
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2006 committed a series of rapes and sexual assaults all within two 
miles of the same location in Arlington, Virginia.155 The victims 
and witnesses told law enforcement that the assailant was a young 
Hispanic man that escaped on a green motorbike.156 The defendant 
in the case was picked up by law enforcement in the same 
geographical area that the assaults occurred, and he was walking 
a green motorbike.157 The defendant did not speak any English; he 
was read his Miranda rights in Spanish and an interview was 
conducted in Spanish.158 The defendant was ultimately charged 
and brought to trial.159  
The defendant made a motion to have an expert witness 
analyze the DNA evidence produced against him, but the trial 
court denied the motion.160 The trial court reasoned that the other 
circumstantial evidence, such as the witnesses, the bike, and the 
geographical location, meant that under the Husske standard of 
particularized need the defendant did not need an expert 
witness.161 According to the court, the Commonwealth did not need 
to provide the defendant an expert witness for the prosecution’s 
DNA evidence when it would be unreasonable; the court found that 
it would be unreasonable considering the fact that the DNA would 
likely play an insignificant part of the evidence presented against 
the defendant.162 
                                                                                                     
Id.  
 155. See id. at 389–90 (explaining there was one brutal rape and a series of 
attempted rapes all involving a Hispanic man with a green dirt bike).  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 390.  
 158. Id. at 392.  
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 395 (describing how the trial court denied Angel’s pretrial 
motion, which he renewed at trial, in addition to asking for a continuance, for an 
expert to review the DNA evidence).  
 161. See id. (articulating the Husske standard, which “require[s] that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent defendants with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense, and, that in certain instances, these basic tools 
may include the appointment of non-psychiatric experts” (quoting Husske v. 
Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996))).  
 162. See id. at 396 (applying the Husske standard, the court must “determine 
whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the evidence complained of by the 
defendant ‘might have contributed to the conviction’” (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967))). The Angel court found that, “[W]hile the DNA 
evidence is the only physical evidence that linking Angel to V.L., the remaining 
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On appeal, Angel had five major assignments of error, only 
three of which are relevant to him being denied an expert 
witness.163 Angel’s first assignment of error was that his supposed 
confession to the police was not a confession but a 
misunderstanding.164 Angel argued that he did not waive his 
Miranda rights when he assented that he understood what the 
officer was saying.165 In addition, Angel argued that he simply 
answered the officer’s questions in the affirmative, but he was 
unable to understand the questions properly because he did not 
speak English.166 Second, Angel argued that because the 
circumstantial witness evidence was aggregated due to the several 
rape and sexual assault charges being joined, the jury was able to 
look at evidence from each of the separate crimes together, which 
made it seem that Angel was the perpetrator.167 Finally, Angel also 
argued that the DNA evidence used at trial was the only physical 
evidence linking him to the crime, and the DNA evidence showed 
a purportedly “very high” match to Angel, but it was not a clear 
match.168 Angel argued that the circumstantial evidence and 
supposed confession were ambiguous evidence, and the 
prosecution’s evidence was significantly strengthened by the 
probative value of the DNA evidence, which Angel could not 
contest with an expert.169 
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed Angel’s argument 
about the appointment of an expert witness by admitting that 
providing Angel an expert might have been appropriate.170 
                                                                                                     
evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of the DNA evidence 
would not have altered the verdict.” Id.  
 163. Id. at 391.  
 164. See id. at 392 (demonstrating how the language barrier had caused 
confusion).  
 165. Id.  
 166. See id. (acknowledging that, in addition, Angel was seventeen, had a 
ninth-grade education, hailed from El Salvador, “had been present in this country 
for only six months,” and his parents were not present).  
 167. See id. at 397 (“Angel argues that the admission of proof relating to these 
crimes was improper because the facts of the incidents were not nearly identical 
to the crimes for which he was on trial in any distinctive aspect and the admission 
of these crimes was more prejudicial than probative.”). 
 168. Id. at 396. 
 169. Id.  
 170. See id. (“The denial of this motion, if error, was harmless error based on 
VIRGINIA’S INTERPRETATION OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA 515 
However, the Supreme Court also stated that the error in denying 
Angel’s motion to be appointed an expert witness was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.171 The Supreme Court determined it 
was a harmless error because the jury could have found that Angel 
was the guilty party based on the remaining evidence outside of 
the forensic DNA.172 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of an 
indigent’s right to an expert witness seems flawed here. Angel 
moved to be appointed an expert witness and was denied because 
of an apparent lack of a particularized need, though DNA evidence 
was the only physical evidence presented against him.173 The 
Court of Appeals “assumed without deciding” that Angel should 
have been appointed an expert witness to assess the 
Commonwealth’s DNA evidence; the Virginia Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction by determining it to be a harmless error.174 
The Court’s reasoning is based on what Angel referred to as the 
Commonwealth’s circumstantial evidence that was pieced together 
only because the charges were brought against Angel jointly.175 
The Court did not address the prejudicial nature of the DNA 
evidence, and how it made the circumstantial evidence look 
concrete, and the confession look irrelevant.176 In Angel, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia reassured other trial courts that they 
may deny indigents’ motions for DNA expert witnesses even 
                                                                                                     
the remaining evidence of identity recited above.”).  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 395.  
 174. Id. at 396.  
 175. See id. at 398 (“Angel argues that if the cases had not been joined ‘it is 
less likely that the subsequent July 9 acts would have been permitted to be heard 
by the [S.P.] jury.”). The Court found that:  
[b]ased on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that the admissible evidence constitutes “overwhelming evidence that 
[Angel] was the perpetrator of the June 18 misdemeanor sexual battery 
against S.P., and thus, any error in joining for trial that offense with 
the offenses against V. L. was harmless on the issue of guilt or 
innocence.”  
Id.  
 176. Id.  
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though it may be needed, if there is any other circumstantial 
evidence available.177 
A case that focuses more on particularized need but shows 
Virginia’s unwillingness to provide a forensic DNA expert 
witnesses to indigent defendants is Branche v. Commonwealth.178 
In this case the defendant, Branche, was accused of assault and 
rape.179 The evidence in the Branche case consisted of the 
testimony of the assailant and victim, Branche’s brief statement to 
the police, and the DNA evidence collected at the crime scene.180  
Branche moved as an indigent defendant to have the 
Commonwealth appoint an expert in forensic DNA evidence to help 
with his defense.181 The defendant was confused because there was 
no DNA of a sexual nature.182 The defendant argued for the 
Commonwealth to appoint a forensic expert with the following 
statement: 
[The Report’s] conclusion is flawed and based on unreliable 
scientific conclusions that will require expert assistance to 
demonstrate. In particular defendant needs to employ experts 
to conduct DNA testing and evaluation of the Commonwealth’s 
evidence. Counsel certifies that if his client had sufficient funds, 
he would routinely employ an expert in this matter.183 
Additionally, the defendant’s motion stated the following in order 
to show the particularized need he had in presenting a defense: 
“[The defendant requests] to have an expert review Dr. Eve Rossi’s 
report, look it over with all supporting documents, and make sure 
                                                                                                     
 177. Id  
 178. See Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *4 
(Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006) (affirming the appellant’s convictions because 
“appellant had such an opportunity and therefore was not denied due process . . . 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant . . . a DNA expert 
at state expense.”).  
 179. Id. at *3.  
 180. Id. at *5.  
 181. See id. at *1 (indicating that the defendant made a written motion 
asserting that his need for a DNA expert was “material in the preparation of his 
defense and the denial of such would be prejudicial to his case and result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial.”).  
 182. See id. (explaining that the DNA report showed analysis of perspiration, 
blood and DNA left on a liquor bottle, but that there was no DNA of oral or vaginal 
swabs matching the defendant or any third party). 
 183. Id.   
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we have the right person, we have the right DNA, make sure it is 
consistent[.]”184 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that Branche’s 
motion should be denied185 The Court of Appeals of Virginia stated 
that just because understanding the highly technical nature of 
DNA is difficult, this does not give rise to a particularized need.186 
The court quoted Husske stating, “[a] hope or suspicion that 
favorable evidence may be procured from an expert, however, is 
not sufficient to require the appointment of an expert[.]”187 
Additionally, the court states that the motion made “generalized 
statements” and “conclusory assertions.”188 The court accepted the 
prosecution’s argument that the DNA evidence was not to prove 
that Branche had committed the rape, but that he had been in the 
room, and the prosecution relied on the victim’s testimony to prove 
the rape.189 The Court of Appeals of Virginia added “an indigent 
defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the state’s expense, to 
all the experts that a non-indigent defendant might afford[.]”190  
The Virginia courts took the opportunity to deny an indigent’s 
motion for a DNA expert by showing that there was additional 
evidence outside of the DNA to find the need was not 
particularized.191 The prosecution’s argument that the DNA was 
only used to prove the defendant’s presence in the room was 
effective in that the defendant cannot show enough of a 
particularized need, or likelihood that the evidence would impact 
the outcome of the case to show that he needed a DNA expert.192 
The DNA evidence was still prejudicial enough to place the 
defendant in the room, and once the defendant was placed in the 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at *2.  
 185. Id. at *5.  
 186. See id. at *3 (stating that with regard to the defendant’s proffer, “‘his 
generalized statements’ and ‘conclusory assertions’ did not show a particularized 
need.”).  
 187. Id. at *3.  
 188. Id.  
 189. See id. at *4 (“[T]he Commonwealth sought to introduce incriminating 
DNA evidence in this case only to prove appellant’s presence in the apartment, 
not sexual contact.”).  
 190. See id. (“[A]n indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the 
state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant might afford.”).  
 191. Id. at *3.  
 192. Id. 
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room of the victim, the victim’s testimony was enough to establish 
that the defendant was the rapist, essentially making the DNA 
evidence the only evidence necessary to convict.193 
In a similar case, involving a car-jacking and murder, Sanchez 
v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted based on two items 
of evidence.194 The first was an ambiguous description provided by 
an eyewitness: the woman who was carjacked.195 The reliability of 
the eyewitness’s testimony was incomplete as she was only able to 
identify one of her two attackers.196 The other evidence the 
prosecution brought against the defendant was DNA from blood 
found on the inside driver’s side door of the car.197 
Prior to the trial the defendant motioned to have an expert 
witness appointed to review the DNA evidence and go over the 
findings.198 The court granted the defendant’s motion agreeing 
                                                                                                     
 193. See id. (“[The defendant] cannot claim that alternate DNA results would 
be essential to his defense, as he did not deny being in the apartment in the first 
place. His strategy at trial was to provide an alternate explanation to the 
evening’s events, not to dispute his presence and involvement.”).  
 194. See Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 337, 345 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding that because the defendant demonstrated a particularized need, it was 
error for the trial court to deny funds for an expert, and thus, the defendant’s 
ability “to rebut and challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence” was frustrated).  
 195. See id. at 339 (demonstrating the inconsistencies found in this witness’ 
testimony). At trial, the witness stated: 
At Sanchez’s preliminary hearing in March 2001, [the witness] 
described the carjacking driver as approximately her height with a 
Hispanic accent. She also identified Sanchez as the driver, although 
she had earlier identified another individual as the driver while she 
was at the courthouse for the preliminary hearing of Sanchez’s 
codefendant in Spring 2000. [B]efore trial, the prosecutor told her that 
[the defendant] confessed to the carjacking. She identified Sanchez as 
the driver and further testified that both men who carjacked her car 
had Hispanic accents. She described the driver as “[her] height or a 
little bit taller,” with a goatee, and “fairly broad, Hispanic type 
features, [and] a rough voice.” She also stated he was in his mid to late 
twenties. [A] Police Officer . . . testified that [the witness] described the 
driver on the date of the carjacking, as Hispanic, between 5’4” and 5’6” 
in height, with a moustache. [The witness], who is 5’3” in height, 
conceded at trial that she might have earlier told a police officer that 
the driver was 5’6” tall and she did not recall saying that he had a 
moustache. 
Id.  
 196. Id. at 340.  
 197. Id. at 345.  
 198. See id. at 340 (stating that the defendant made the motion “to evaluate 
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that there was a particularized need.199 The defendant made a 
pretrial motion for additional funds to have the expert witness 
testify at trial, as the previous funds had been exhausted in having 
the expert analyze the data.200 The court denied the motion for 
additional funds and the defendant was subsequently convicted.201 
The defendant argued that denying the motion had been 
erroneous and stated, “[the expert] has noticed that there were 
errors in the way that the DNA procedures were followed, that 
there were errors in the way the examination was done, which 
could have had a significant impact in the results of the DNA[.]”202 
Again, similar to Angel, the Court of Appeals determined that the 
denial of additional funds by the trial court was erroneous.203 The 
DNA evidence was the only physical evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime.204 Additionally, the proffer that the 
defendant’s DNA expert had found evidence that the tests 
performed by the Commonwealth contained errors was likely to 
impact the outcome of the case.205  
Regardless of the erroneous deprivation of the funds to hire 
the expert witness to testify at trial, the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia determined that the error was harmless and the 
additional evidence from the eyewitness was sufficient in 
conjunction with the DNA evidence to convict the defendant.206  
                                                                                                     
the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence and the processes by which it was 
developed.”).  
 199. See id. (granting the defendant $3,000 for such an expert).  
 200. See id. at 340 (establishing that Sanchez had been granted $3,000 to hire 
an expert witness, but the witness charged $1,750, which meant that Sanchez did 
not have enough to bring the expert witness to court to testify about the analysis 
he had written up). 
 201. Id. at 340–41.   
 202. Id. at 340.  
 203. See id. at 342–43 (“Sanchez’s proffer demonstrated a particularized 
need . . . . Sanchez’s ability to challenge the validity of the Commonwealth’s DNA 
results was truncated by the trial court’s denial of the additional funds that 
Sanchez sought.”). 
 204. Id. at 343.  
 205. Id.  
 206. See id. at 344 (finding harmless error in light of the evidence: his 
confession, his description of “his actions on the date in question in detail . . . 
corroborat[ion]” of a witness’ testimony, as well as the shoe impression on the 
driver’s window). 
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Virginia’s particularized need standard has created a 
standard of showing that is more difficult to meet than is required 
by the Supreme Court in Ake.207 This creates a system where the 
majority of indigent defendants granted expert DNA witnesses at 
the trial will be defendants where the only evidence or only 
material evidence brought against them is DNA or forensic.  
B. Standard Met 
While Virginia courts are likely to deny an indigent 
defendant’s motion for a DNA expert witness for a defendant if 
there is any evidence in addition to the DNA, the opposite is true 
if the defendant is faced with only DNA evidence.208 Two cases in 
particular illustrate Virginia courts applying Ake and Husske to 
indigent defendant cases, and in those cases the only evidence 
presented against the defendants was DNA.209 The first case is 
Lawlor v. Commonwealth,210 in which the defendant was charged 
with capital murder subsequent to rape or attempted rape.211 The 
victim in the case was raped in her studio apartment and 
subsequently beaten to death with a metal cooking pot found at the 
scene of the crime.212 The only physical evidence found at the crime 
scene was DNA taken off of the victim’s body and off “the wooden 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 930 (Va. 1996) (Poff, J., 
dissenting) (discussing that the Ake rule only applies if “the defendant makes a 
threshold showing that the assistance of an expert to confront the prosecution 
will be a significant factor at trial.”). The Husske Court stated that the Ake rule 
“require[s] a State to provide ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense’ . . . to those 
defendants who cannot afford to pay for them.” See id. at 929 (quoting Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).  
 208. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 895 (Va. 2013) (affirming 
that the defendant is guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death); Dowdy v. 
Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710, 724 (Va. 2009) (affirming the Court of Appeals 
in “upholding Dowdy’s conviction for the rape and first-degree murder of Judy 
Jaimie Coate.”).  
 209. See Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 859 (showing that only DNA evidence linked 
the defendant to the crime and the trial court appointed an expert witness); 
Dowdy, 686 S.E.2d at 720–21 (illustrating that only DNA evidence linked the 
defendant to the crime and the trial court appointed an expert witness).   
 210. See generally Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d.  
 211. Id. at 859.  
 212. Id.  
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pot handle, and the frying pan.”213 The defendant, Lawlor, was a 
lease consultant who lived in the victim’s building and had access 
to each of the apartments.214 Due to the victim’s unfortunate death, 
at trial the only evidence that directly linked Lawlor to the crime 
was the apparent DNA evidence that the Commonwealth 
brought.215  
The defendant, Lawlor, motioned for funds for an expert 
witness to be provided by the Commonwealth.216 The defendant 
requested an expert be funded to travel to Uruguay to collect DNA 
evidence from the individual that Lawlor argued had actually 
committed the rape, in order to refute the DNA evidence provided 
by the Commonwealth. The first was an expert DNA analyst that 
the defendant wanted to use to refute the DNA evidence brought 
against him by the Commonwealth.217 The second was a private 
investigator to travel to Uruguay to collect DNA from the 
individual that Lawlor argued had actually committed the rape 
and murder.218 The trial court granted Lawlor’s motion for a DNA 
analyst but denied the motion for funds to hire the private 
investigator.219 The court cited Husske, saying “this Court noted 
that an indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the 
state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant 
might afford[.]”220 By citing Husske, the court explicitly illustrated 
that it in fact employed the particularized need standard of 
showing for an indigent defendant who requested funds for an 
expert witness.221 
                                                                                                     
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at 859–60.  
 216. See id. at 872–73 (demonstrating that Lawlor made a motion for funding 
to “send an investigator to Uruguay” which he renewed on January 13, 2011).  
 217. Id.  
 218. Id.  
 219. See id. at 873 (“The court then ruled that Lawlor had a right to call 
Delgado at trial and that it would provide funds to make Delgado available as a 
defense witness. However, it denied the request for funds to send the investigator 
to Uruguay.”). 
 220. See id. at 872 (stating that “an indigent defendant is not constitutionally 
entitled, at the state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant 
might afford”) (quoting Crawford v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 107, 115 (Va. 
2011)).  
 221. See id. (“It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate this ‘particularized 
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Additionally, Lawlor made several subsequent funding 
requests for the DNA expert as the DNA evidence became more 
important.222 The court repeatedly granted the requests until the 
final request was for the analysis of single hair found in the 
apartment that had been present for an indeterminate amount of 
time.223 Unlike Husske, Angel, Branche, or Sanchez, the only 
evidence directly linking Lawlor to the rape and murder was the 
DNA evidence, which meant that the court had to provide a DNA 
expert in order to afford Lawlor the “basic tools” necessary to 
preserve a fair trial.224 
A second case that illustrates the particularized need rule is 
Dowdy v. Commonwealth.225 Like Lawlor, Dowdy involves the 
brutal rape and murder of a woman in Virginia.226 The defendant, 
like Lawlor, lived in close proximity to the victim and even 
admitted to having intercourse with the victim a few days prior to 
the rape and murder.227 Also like Lawlor, because the unfortunate 
victim had been murdered and there was little circumstantial 
evidence beyond the fact that he had intercourse with the victim 
previously, the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime 
was the DNA evidence found on the victim’s body.228 
Also like Lawlor, Dowdy moved as an indigent to have the 
funds to appoint an expert provided by Commonwealth.229 Dowdy 
wanted a private investigator hired to interview the victim’s 
friends to better understand who she had been seen with that 
                                                                                                     
need’ by establishing that an expert’s services would materially assist him in 
preparing his defense and that the lack of such assistance would result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial.”).  
 222. Id. at 873.  
 223. See id. at 874 (“‘The Defense has asked the Court to test virtually 
everything that’s there . . . [without] any basis that would produce evidence of a 
second participant. . . .”).  
 224. See id. (finding it was not an abuse of discretion when the court granted 
the requests for DNA testing, “despite the fact that Lawlor admitted participating 
in the murder and the overwhelming consistency of the forensic evidence,” and 
denied a DNA test as to a hair fragment.). 
 225. 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009). 
 226. Id. at 712.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  
 229. Id.  
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day.230 Also, Dowdy wanted the funds to hire an expert DNA 
analyst to refute the Commonwealth’s DNA and forensic 
evidence.231 The Commonwealth had spermatozoa swabs, bloody 
fingerprints, and hairs collected from the body.232 The court denied 
Dowdy’s motion for a private investigator, citing Husske and 
arguing that Dowdy had not made a particularized enough 
showing to warrant appointment of funds for a private 
investigator.233 However, the court did provide Dowdy with the 
funds to hire an expert DNA and forensics analyst.234  
V. Problems 
The differences between the Husske strain of cases, where 
expert witnesses were denied, and the Dowdy and Lawlor strain of 
cases, where expert witnesses were appointed, show that Virginia 
court’s particularized need standard of showing can be met. The 
distinguishable facts that would cause the differences in the 
outcome between the two cases are the presence or absence of 
evidence other than the DNA brought by the prosecution. In the 
Husske strain of cases there was evidence, usually circumstantial, 
in addition to the DNA evidence.235 In the Dowdy and Lawlor 
strain the evidence was only the DNA type evidence.236 According 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Ake the indigent 
defendant must make a showing that an expert witness will be a 
significant factor in his defense.237 The Supreme Court of Virginia 
determined in Husske that an indigent defendant must make a 
showing that not only would an expert witness play a significant 
                                                                                                     
 230. Id.   
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 714.  
 233. See id. at 712 (“[T]he circuit court explained that Dowdy needed to 
demonstrate not only that the subject for which excerpt assistance was sought, 
i.e., Dowdy’s alleged alibi, would be a significant factor in his defense but also 
that he would be prejudiced without the services of an investigator.”). 
 234. Id. at 713.  
 235. See supra Section IV(A) (analyzing the particularized need standard in 
the Husske strain of cases). 
 236. See supra Section IV(B) (discussing the particularized need standard in 
the Dowdy and Lawlor strain of cases). 
 237. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). 
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factor in his defense, but that it be reasonable to the defense, which 
is what the court called a particularized need showing.238 This 
determination created a heightened showing that departs from Ake 
and violates an indigent’s rights to a fair trial, which is seen when 
the outcome showing required in Husske and progeny are 
compared to Ake on the similar facts where circumstantial 
evidence was present in addition to evidence which required the 
testimony of an expert witness.239  
In the spectrum of indigent defendants in Virginia, only the 
defendants that are so clearly within the particularized need, 
because the only evidence brought against them is DNA, will be 
properly afforded an expert witness to help prepare a defense.240 
These defendants should be granted expert witnesses due to the 
highly technical and probative nature of DNA. Many juries take 
DNA results as evidence beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of 
how the Commonwealth presents it.241 Additionally if a defendant 
does not have an expert of his or her own then the defendant will 
be unable to challenge the DNA evidence at trial.242 Also, it is 
                                                                                                     
 238. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996). The 
Husske court explained: 
[T]he Supreme Court [has] noted that a trial court properly denied an 
indigent defendant’s requests for the appointment of a criminal 
investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert . . . because 
the defendant’s requests were accompanied by no showing of 
reasonableness . . . . Moreover, an indigent defendant’s constitutional 
right to the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth’s expense, 
is not absolute. We hold that an indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s expense, 
must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance 
of the expert is “likely to be a significant factor in his defense,” and that 
he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance. An indigent 
defendant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the services 
of an expert would materially assist him in the preparation of his 
defense and that the denial of such services would result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial. The indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert must show a particularized need[.] 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 239. See supra Section IV (comparing the standard as applied in differing 
Virginia cases).  
 240. See generally Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013); 
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009).  
 241. See NRC II, supra note 39, at 205 (discussing the bias jurors have 
towards DNA evidence as demonstrated through a study). 
 242. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364. 
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possible that some DNA evidence presented might not be produced 
using proper methods, or might even be fabricated, and there is no 
way for an indigent defendant to challenge the evidence without 
an expert.243 
Every other indigent defendant in Virginia where DNA 
evidence is presented against them along with other evidence will 
likely be denied their motion for an expert witness. The 
circumstantial and witness evidence might not even be the 
evidence linking the defendant to the crime, yet the DNA evidence, 
which is probative by nature, will be used and the defendant will 
not be able to challenge it.244 
VI. Solutions 
Virginia’s adoption of the heightened standard denies 
indigents the “basic tools” for a fair trial. The lack of basic tools 
includes the inability to effectively and cogently defend against 
complex and scientific evidence that requires an expert to impeach 
and is prejudicial in nature.245 Additionally, if an indigent 
defendant is unable to meet Virginia’s heightened standard, then 
he or she has no way to guarantee or impeach the evidence for 
accuracy or government bias.246  
Absent legislative action or the Supreme Court of the United 
States redefining indigent rights to experts, it is up to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia to overturn the showing standard established in 
Husske, and reinstate the Ake standard. This solution seems 
unlikely because the Supreme Court of Virginia has gone back to 
Husske time and time again. Additionally, there are policy 
arguments for not overturning the Husske standard.247 The 
Virginia courts, which are cash-strapped, already have a practical 
                                                                                                     
 243. Id.   
 244. Id. 
 245. Id.; see Roth, supra note 22, at 1358 (explaining that the use of DNA 
matching evidence makes it difficult for jurors to separate probability of 
innocence or guilt from certainty).  
 246. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (2009). 
 247. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (“[T]his 
Due Process requirement, however, does not confer a right upon an indigent 
defendant to receive, at the Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a non-
indigent defendant may purchase[.]”). 
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interest not to award stipends for expert witnesses for every 
criminal defendant, especially if there is inculpatory evidence 
outside of the DNA or forensic evidence presented.248 Also, 
granting more expert witnesses increases the time and burden on 
the courts.249  
Virginia alternatively could create a DNA and forensic expert 
witness system akin to the Public Defender institutions.250 Such a 
system would alleviate the prosecutorial bias of expert 
witnesses.251 Again, the issue of financial and workload burdens 
would likely make such a system infeasible.252 
Finances and the amount of cases handled by the courts are a 
real issue, but they need to be weighed against justice. Virginia is 
creating a system where indigent defendants are significantly 
more vulnerable to criminal charges based solely on the type of 
evidence presented against them.253 Indigent defendants are being 
treated differently than wealthy defendants because they now 
have to make a showing that a wealthy defendant would not need 
to make.254  
VII. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court of Virginia incorrectly read two Supreme 
Court decisions together to create a showing standard not 
articulated by the Supreme Court. This heightened showing 
required by indigent defendants creates a potential violation of 
equal protection, but surely violates the “basic tools required for a 
fair trial” when DNA and forensic evidence is presented against a 
criminal defendant. 
                                                                                                     
 248. Id.  
 249. Id.  
 250. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon's Call in the Twenty-First Century: 
Holistic Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 
961, 963–64 (2013) (explaining the benefits of a holistic defense from a public 
defender).  
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364 (highlighting the unfair advantage 
a well-funded prosecution has over an indigent defendant). 
 254. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
